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NEW LIGHT ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, III. RUSSIA AND THE OTHER POWERS

A good many new sources of information in regard to Russia's part in the tragic days of July, 1914, have appeared since the publication of the original Russian Orange Book soon after the outbreak of the war.[1] This suppressed a considerable part of the diplomatic correspondence of the days preceding that event. The Bolsheviki have not seen fit to follow the example of the Central Powers and give a complete publication of all the diplomatic correspondence which passed through the Russian Foreign Office, as Kautsky and Gooss have done respectively for Germany and Austria.[2] Nevertheless, a few of these suppressed documents, particularly those which passed between Sazonov and the Russian ambassadors in Paris and London, Izvolski and Benckendorff, were published in a series of articles in the Russian *Pravda,* in 1919, by M. Pokrovski. They are interpreted by him and by the Germans to prove Sazonov's aggressive intentions against Constantinople and the Straits and his scheming efforts to get England's support in case of a Russian attack on Germany.[3] The Kautsky and Gooss documents contain also a great many despatches from Petrograd, giving many hitherto unknown details about what was happening in the Russian capital.

More important are the secret mobilization-telegrams and other military documents which the Germans captured in the Warsaw district during the course of the war, published by Hoeniger.[4]

[1] *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 266–298.

[2] See above, vol. XXV., pp. 616 ff.

[3] *Pravda,* nos. 5–7, Feb. 23–Mar. 9, 1919; translated in *Deutschland Schuldig,* pp. 188–208. For other indications of Sazonov's aggressive aims, and particularly his memorandum of March, 1914, for a sudden naval attack to secure control of the Straits, see the documents published by the Bolsheviks in seven fascicules, between December, 1917, and February, 1918, conveniently translated and arranged by E. Laloy, *Les Documents Secrets des Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Russie publiés par les Bolcheviks* (Paris, 1919). *Cf.* also Bogitshevich, *Causes of the War* (Amsterdam, 1919); Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (London, 1920). Possibly even if the Bolsheviki wished to make a full publication of the diplomatic correspondence it would be difficult for them to do so in view of the possible destruction or dispersion which may have resulted from the haste and confusion with which the archives are said to have been packed up when the German armies seemed to threaten Petrograd in 1917.

[4] R. Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919); also his "Untersuchungen zum Suchomlinowprozess", in *Deutsche Rundschau,* CLXXV.

Most interesting and dramatic of all, though not so trustworthy historically, are the revelations which were made at the Sukhomlinov trial in August and September, 1917. The Sukhomlinov trial will remain one of the *causes célèbres* of the twentieth century. In 1917, when the war was going very badly for Russia, Russian public opinion demanded a scapegoat. Sukhomlinov, the former minister of war, was popularly held to be one of the persons chiefly responsible for the Russian disasters. He was arrested and brought to trial. At the hearings, which lasted nearly two months, a great amount of Russian dirty linen was washed in public. There was given in great detail the history of Sukhomlinov's relations with his pretty but extravagant young wife, who had been divorced by doubtful means from a rich old man in order that she might marry the Russian Minister of War. All Sukhomlinov's shady or indiscreet relations with the spies, such as Miasoiedov and Altschiller, who were executed for espionage in 1915, were set forth at length. The lack of co-ordination in the government departments and the pitiful shortage of ammunition and equipment of all sorts were mercilessly laid bare. And, finally, Sukhomlinov's measures toward mobilization during the days immediately preceding the declaration of war were discussed at some length. Highly sensational testimony was given, but it is very difficult for the historian to draw conclusions from it. No official stenographic report of it was ever published. One has to rely on the reports given in the Russian newspapers. But the newspaper reporters, or the editors, have so garbled the accounts of the trial that in many instances different newspapers give flatly contradictory reports of what was evidently the same piece of testimony. But even after comparing the fullest reports in several of the most important newspapers of different political complexion, and thereby establishing a probable approximation to the testimony which was actually given in court, this testimony is so contradictory with itself, with the secret mobilization-telegrams printed by Hoeniger, and with much of the diplomatic correspondence, that it must be used with the greatest caution. Generals who in 1917 were defending themselves against the charge of having been duped by Germany, and of having made insufficient military preparations, would be inclined, after three years of war, to exaggerate on the one hand the German "threats" as the cause and jus-

15–80 (April, 1918); and "Fürst Tundutow über die Russische Mobilmachung", *ibid* CLXXVI. 150–165 (August, 1918). These telegrams are particularly important because they are contemporary evidence which enables one to check the contradictory statements made from memory three years later at the Sukhomlinov trial.

tification of Russia's general mobilization, and on the other hand their own perspicacity in foreseeing the "inevitability" of war and consequently in disobeying their peace-loving master, Nicholas II., who forbade them to proceed with their military measures. Professor Oman emphasizes the German "threats" to prove that Germany was the party really responsible for the fatal succession of mobilizations. The Germans emphasize the disobedience and deception of the Russian militarists to prove just the contrary. Within the brief limits of this article it is not possible to analyze all the misrepresentations of fact which were made at the trial, nor to state, in detail, the reasons for rejecting many of the views of both Oman and the Germans. Only a brief narrative and a statement of conclusions may be given, the analysis on which they are based being left to a larger work.[5]

[5] The Russian newspapers which I have read are the *Izviestiia, Novoe Vremia, Russkiia Viedomosti, Riech, Novaia Zhizn.* An excellent account of the scandalous personal affairs of Sukhomlinov, his wife, his friends of dubious reputation, and the spies, is given by E. H. Wilcox, *Russia's Ruin* (New York, 1919), pp. 35–117; but Wilcox says practically nothing about the all-important question of Russian mobilization. Robert Wilton, *Russia's Agony* (New York, 1919), devotes two chapters to the outbreak of hostilities and the deficiencies of Russian equipment; he quotes at length the testimony of Ianushkevich, apparently using the report in the *Russkoe Slovo*; but as he makes no critical comments on Ianushkevich's testimony, nearly every sentence of which is inaccurate, Wilton's account is of little value. Professor Oman, in his admirable book on *The Outbreak of the War, 1914–1918* (London, 1919), ch. VII., gives by far the best account of the Russian mobilization which has appeared in English; it is based on the *Novoe Vremia* report of the Sukhomlinov trial, on some other unnamed paper (apparently the *Russkoe Slovo*), and on the accounts of the trial in the German newspapers. The question is touched upon in the *New Republic*, XVIII. 127–128, 348–351 (Mar. 1, Apr. 12, 1919), and by H. N. Brailsford in the London *Nation* of Sept. 15, 1917. For further light on Russian military preparations and mobilizations, see: B. Gourko, *Russia, 1914–1917* (New York, 1919), pp. 1–24; V. D. Doumbadze, *Russia's War Minister* (London, 1915), a grotesquely laudatory work by one of Sukhomlinov's disreputable friends who was later exiled to Siberia on the charge of giving military information to the enemy—it was one of the charges against Sukhomlinov that he had allowed Doumbadze to have a secret synopsis of Russia's military reforms; B. von Eggeling, *Die Russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegsausbruch* (Berlin, 1919), by the German military attaché in Russia; H. von Kuhl, *Der Deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920), valuable because the author held a high position for a quarter of a century in the German General Staff and indicates what the Germans supposed the Russians were doing; *Russlands Mobilmachung für den Weltkrieg: Neue Urkunden zur Geschichte des Weltkrieges, herausg. auf Befehl des Chefs des Generalstabes des Feldheeres* (Berlin, 1919); Georg Steinhausen, *Die Grundfehler des Krieges und der Generalstab*; Immanuel, *Siege und Niederlagen im Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1919); Frantz, "Der Russische Aufmarsch gegen Deutschland im August 1914", in *Wissen und Wehr* (Jahrgang 1920, heft 2); E. Sauerbeck, *Der Kriegsausbruch* (Basel, 1918).

The first news of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand made a painful impression in Russia as everywhere else in the civilized world. But this was soon overshadowed by the fear that Austria might now attempt to take a dangerous revenge on Serbia. In an interview with Pourtalès, the German ambassador, Sazonov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, bitterly but shrewdly criticized the conduct of the Austrian officials: they had not only permitted excesses against the Serbs but he was convinced had purposely given a free rein to the popular fury. He denied Austria's assertion that the assassination was the result of a Great Serbian plot; at least, he said, there was not the slightest proof of this so far, and it was exceedingly unjust to hold the Serbian government responsible, as the Austro-Hungarian newspapers were doing. This was no more justifiable than it would have been for Russia to call the French government to account for the crimes which were plotted on French soil and committed in Russia. The Serbian government, he said, was taking a completely correct attitude. The Serajevo crime was only the isolated act of immature young persons and there was no proof of their connection with any deep-laid political plot. When Pourtalès sounded the old note of the solidarity of monarchical interests against such dangerous anarchistic murderers, he found that Sazonov responded to this ancient theme with less warmth than usual.[6]

In the middle of July, Sazonov spent several days at his country estate near Grodno. He wanted a rest before the exacting demands on his strength, which would be made by the approaching visit of the French president and prime minister. Such an absence from Petrograd seemed, at that time, quite safe. The political horizon, in spite of Serajevo, seemed still unclouded. He had no thought of war,[7] for Berchtold had deceitfully given an appearance of calm at Vienna and the Austrian chief of staff had left the capital in order further to lull to sleep the suspicions of Europe. He had returned to Petrograd by July 18, and was beginning to grow nervous at the ominous silence of the Vienna authorities. To the Austrian and German ambassadors he reiterated his views that it was unjust to make a whole people responsible for the crime of a single individual, as the Austrian newspapers were doing. "Russia," he said, "would not be indifferent to any effort to humiliate

[6] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 13, 1914. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 53.

[7] This, at any rate, was the conviction of the Russian ambassador in London; *cf.* Benckendorff's views as reported by Lichnowsky on July 16 and 20. *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 62 and 85.

Serbia. Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia. In short, 'La politique de la Russie est pacifique, mais pas passive.'"[8] In this attitude he was undoubtedly strengthened by Poincaré's visit, though we do not know precisely what took place in the secret conversations between the highest officials of the two allied countries, as well as with Buchanan, the English ambassador in Petrograd. The following telegram, which Viviani sent to Paris as he was leaving Russia, probably sums up accurately their provisional understanding:

REVAL, July 24, 1914, 1 A. M.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonov, expressed the idea that his government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his government to this effect.[9]

Evidently the Triple Entente was planning to offer some such identical counsels of moderation when it was suddenly confronted, on Friday morning, July 24, with the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

Everywhere the extreme demands and the intransigent tone of the ultimatum caused the most painful astonishment and the most serious misgivings. Sir Edward Grey "had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character". Sazonov at once became highly excited.[10]

[8] Szápáry to Berchtold, July 18, *Red Book*, I., no. 25; Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 21, *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 120.

[9] *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 154.

[10] The interview in which Szápáry informed Sazonov of the Austrian ultimatum has hitherto been chiefly derived from Szápáry's account as printed in the Austrian Red Book of 1915, no. 14; *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 457–458—but this combines two telegrams into one and omits seven passages; *cf.* Szápáry to Berchtold, July 24, *Red Book*, II., nos. 17, 18; *cf.* also I., nos. 29, 30. For Berchtold's simultaneous interview with Kudachev, the Russian chargé in Vienna, see *Red Book*, II., no. 23.

Of a naturally mercurial temperament, he was now particularly indignant at Berchtold's methods. The short time-limit, the withholding of the *dossier,* and the excessive and humiliating demands on Serbia, all seemed to indicate that Austria was determined on war at once with Serbia. It was particularly deceitful on Austria's part to have pretended for three weeks that the demands would be mild, and such as Serbia could surely accept, and then to face the little kingdom with an ultimatum which seemed to indicate that Austria wanted war and would soon cross the frontier into Serbian territory. Moreover, Poincaré and the French prime minister had only left Russia a few hours before. They were now on the high seas, where it was difficult, if not impossible, for Sazonov to get into touch with them. Furthermore, he shrewdly suspected that much that Szápáry had asserted was not true. But he did not know for certain, as we do now, how perfidiously Berchtold had acted in carefully suppressing the Wiesner report, which wholly exculpated the Serbian government, in deliberately framing the ultimatum so that Serbia could not accept it, and in holding back the *dossier,* because an impartial examination of it by Europe would not have borne out Austria's charges. Therefore, Sazonov concluded that his own wisest course was to seek to have the Austro-Serbian question treated as a question in which Europe was interested. He must not allow the "localization", which meant the inevitable humiliation or defeat of a small power by a great one.

Accordingly, after his interview with Szápáry on Friday morning, Sazonov hurried at once to the French embassy, after telephoning to the British ambassador to join him there. Sazonov, Paléologue, and Buchanan went over the situation carefully. Sazonov said that he regarded "Austria's conduct as both provocative and immoral; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted and he hoped that England would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. . . . [Paléologue let it be understood that] France would fulfil all the obligations entailed upon her by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations". Buchanan very cautiously and correctly represented Grey's precise views. He "saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from England that would entail an unconditional engagement to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion". In reply, Sazonov still insisted it must not be forgotten that the gen-

eral European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue. As Sazonov was unable to persuade Buchanan into making a statement of solidarity, which could be used as an effective bluff at Vienna, he declared that he thought that at any rate Russian mobilization would have to be carried out.[11]

This discussion between the three representatives of the Triple Entente reveals the situation which became clearer as the crisis became more serious: France and Russia pressed England to join them in a statement of solidarity, which could be used as an effective counter-bluff, or even as a threat, to prevent Austria and Germany from acting against Serbia. But to this Buchanan and Grey would not, at first, agree. They did not encourage Russia's strong action by holding out the hope of British armed support, as so many Germans have asserted. On the contrary, Sir Edward Grey was very reserved and cautious as to saying or doing anything which might encourage Russia to mobilize and so precipitate a crisis. All his thoughts and efforts were directed toward finding some peaceful solution for the crisis and avoiding anything which might aggravate it. They are too well known to need repeating here. It was only very gradually, as Germany and Austria deliberately blocked all his earlier peace proposals, that Grey became finally convinced of the *mala fides* of the Central Powers and consequently began to give Lichnowsky the "friendly warnings".

On leaving the conference with Buchanan and Paléologue at the French embassy, Sazonov became still more nervous and excited because he was uncertain of English support. In a somewhat stormy interview with Pourtalès on Friday evening, July 24, Sazonov argued quite logically that the promises which Serbia had made in 1909, as Austria had incautiously admitted in her note to Serbia, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers; consequently the affair was a European one and not one to be "localized"; it was for Europe to examine the *dossier* and investigate whether Serbia had lived up to her promises or not. Austria could not be both prosecutor and judge. These arguments Pourtalès promised to report to

[11] Buchanan to Grey, July 24, *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 14–15. This account by Buchanan of the meeting of the three representatives of the Triple Entente is full and frank in contrast with the brief report of Paléologue, *ibid.*, p. 163. That Buchanan correctly represented Grey is clear from the latter's reply next day: "You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said." (Grey to Buchanan, July 25, *ibid.*, p. 25.)

Berlin, but "he doubted whether Germany would expect her ally to lay the results of her investigation before a European Areopagus". Austria would object, as any Great Power would do, to subject to arbitration a question in which her vital interests were at stake. Finally Sazonov exclaimed, "If Austria gobbles up Serbia, we shall make war on her".[12]

On the afternoon of Saturday, July 25, the wave of midsummer heat which had been hanging over Petrograd for a month seemed to reach its climax. The trains were crowded with peace-loving people pouring out for the summer holidays. Out on the sun-baked plain at Krasnoe Selo, the Tsar and all the diplomatic and military world gathered to witness the usual summer review of the Russian troops. But the review was postponed for an hour on account of an important Crown Council at which the Tsar presided. Even when the review finally took place, it was cut short, and an unusual military excitement pervaded all the officers. The military attachés got the impression that the Crown Council had considered, perhaps even ordered, the mobilization of the Russian army. After the review had taken place, in an abbreviated form, it was announced that the manoeuvres here and in the whole empire were to be broken off, and that the troops were to return to their standing quarters. The feeling that mobilization and war were imminent was increased by the premature promotion of the cadets from the Petrograd Military Academy as officers. At the banquet following the review, young officers openly expressed their joy that now at last something was starting against Austria. Following the banquet there was a theatrical performance, which, under the leadership of the Grand Duke Nicholas, was made the occasion of a great demonstration for war. That evening, Petrograd was startled out of its stillness by the unexpected sound of the Imperial Guards galloping back to the capital, although they were to have been quartered out at Krasnoe Selo for another month.[13]

What were the decisions taken at this important Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo in the presence of the Tsar? We have no precise record, but we may surmise that a conflict of opinion took place be-

[12] Telegram of Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 25, 1:08 A.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 160; the German *White Book* (*Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 427, exhibit 4) suppresses nearly all of this interesting telegram. For many other details of this interview, see Pourtalès's long letter to Bethmann of July 25, in *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 204; and Pourtalès's account of it to the Austrian ambassador, Szápáry to Berchtold, July 25, 2:30 A.M., *Red Book*, II., no. 19.

[13] *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 194, 291; Eggeling, pp. 22–27; *Red Book*, II., nos. 41, 60; Meriel Buchanan, *The City of Trouble* (New York, 1918), pp. 10–12.

tween the civilians and the militarists. There are good reasons for believing that, on the one side, the Tsar, Count Fredericks, Sazonov, and Krivoshéin sincerely wished to avoid war and hoped that it could be avoided, perhaps through England's efforts. The civilians wanted no more military measures than were necessary to bluff Austria out of her intended attack upon Serbia. On the other hand the militarists, led by the Grand Duke Nicholas, by Sukhomlinov, minister of war, and by Ianushkevich, chief of the General Staff, urged more complete military measures. They felt that a war between Austria and Serbia was necessarily a war between Austria and Russia, and they had no doubt that Austria was about to begin an invasion of Serbia as soon as the time-limit expired. In fact, later in the day, a Russian officer, looking at his watch at six o'clock, remarked to the German officer attached to the Tsar's suite, "The cannon on the Danube will have begun to fire by now, for one doesn't send such an ultimatum except when the cannon are loaded".[14] They were probably convinced that war was "inevitable", and that here was Russia's heaven-sent opportunity to have her final reckoning with Germany and to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. Therefore the sooner full mobilization was declared the better.

It is quite possible that one of their arguments in favor of mobilization was the dangerous domestic situation. Petrograd and all the larger cities were in the throes of an extensive working-men's strike. By a strange irony of fate, at the same moment when the Russian military bands, in the camp at Krasnoe Selo, had been welcoming Poincaré with the Marseillaise, the Cossacks in the suburbs of Petrograd had been striking down working-men for singing this same Marseillaise.[15]

At any rate, whatever the arguments used at this council, at least two definite decisions were taken. First, it was agreed that the troops throughout the empire should at once be recalled from their summer training camps to their standing quarters. It was in their standing quarters that the full equipments were kept which were necessary for war, and which they must have before they could start for the front. Ianushkevich, chief of staff, lost no time in putting the decision into execution.[16] This breaking off of manoeuvres

[14] Chelius to the Kaiser, July 26. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 291.

[15] For indications of conflict between militarists and civilians, see *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 130, 194, 203, 204, 338; *Red Book*, II., nos. 60, 61, 73; III., nos. 19, 71; Nekludov, pp. 284–285.

[16] He must have telephoned an order from Krasnoe Selo to Petrograd, for at 4: 10 P.M. there were sent out from the General Staff to the chief of staff of the Warsaw military district the secret cipher telegrams, nos. 1547 and 1557:

and return of the troops to their standing quarters was not, however, in any way equivalent to mobilization. It must, to be sure, precede mobilization, but it was not in any way a menacing or hostile act. France and Germany both ordered similar measures a little later. The return of the Imperial Guards to Petrograd on Saturday night, July 25, is to be explained as a part of this general preparation for possible action.

The second decision taken by the Crown Council was one desired by Sazonov and is probably accurately indicated by the account of it which he gave to the French:

> At the council of ministers of the twenty-fifth, which was held in the presence of the Tsar, the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed Prussia to bear upon Serbia and not until after notice had been given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations, even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.[17]

This is confirmed by the testimony of Ianushkevich at the Sukhomlinov trial in 1917: "At first it had been decided only to proclaim a partial mobilization—the four districts—to frighten off Austria-Hungary."[18]

In other words, for the Tsar, Sazonov, and all the diplomats, this Crown Council meant that Russia intended to threaten Austria with a "partial mobilization" in case Austria crossed the Serbian frontier. But even this partial mobilization was to take place only if and when Sazonov should decide it should be done. And even if Belgrade were occupied, he might still continue to negotiate for peace. He did not need to break off diplomatic relations with Austria nor yield to the militarists in his own country. Sazonov was highly delighted with this solution and during the next two days was exceedingly optimistic and conciliatory, so much so that it was

"Prepare quickly transport plans and summaries for the return of all troops to their standing quarters. Time for the completion of the work: twenty-four hours. 1547. [*Signed*] General Dobrovolski." Later the same day, at 11:59 P.M., perhaps after Ianushkevich had returned to Petrograd, telegram no. 1557: "His Majesty commands that upon the arrival of this telegram the troops are to return from their camps to their standing quarters. . . . 1557. [*Signed*] Bjölajev." Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung*, p. 80.

[17] Bienvenu-Martin's summary, July 26, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 174. In the third line, it would have been more correct to translate *eventuellement* "contingently" or "in case of need" than "eventually".

[18] *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, Aug. 13 [26], 1917.

specially remarked by a number of persons.[19] He believed that he had the trump cards in his hand. He could continue to negotiate, but he had the threat of force with which to strengthen his hand. Also the militarists in Russia could not get control, because the decision for partial mobilization lay only in his power.

The militarists, however, were not satisfied with these two decisions. They proceeded to take a further and far more wide-reaching action, though whether they did this in accordance with the decision of the Council or without the knowledge of the Tsar or Sazonov, merely on their own authority, is not certain. At any rate, after the Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo they lost no time in beginning to put into operation secret "measures preparatory to war". In the frontier districts toward the Central Powers, these measures were almost equivalent to mobilization, although they did not require a public announcement of mobilization. This seems to be the meaning of two secret cipher telegrams, numbers 1566 and 1575, which Ianushkevich sent out from the General Staff before dawn on Sunday morning, July 26, to the commanders of the troops in the Warsaw military district:

PETROGRAD, July 13[26], 1 A. M.

His Majesty commands all the fortresses of the district to be placed on a war footing. It is ordered to begin with the works which are indicated in "surveys 1 and 2" attached to the Instruction Concerning the Period Preparatory to War, confirmed by His Majesty on February 17 [Mar. 2], 1913. 1556. [*Signed*] Lieut.-Gen. IANUSHKEVICH.[20]

PETROGRAD, July 13 [26], 3:26 A. M.

His Majesty commands that July 26 is to be reckoned as the beginning of the Period Preparatory to War in the whole territory of European Russia. You are to take, according to surveys 1 and 2 of the Instruction Concerning this Period, all the measures which are to be carried out . . . 1575. [*Signed*] Lieut.-Gen. IANUSHKEVICH.[21]

[19] By Pourtalès (*Kautsky Docs.*, no. 217); by Szápáry (*Red Book*, II., nos. 73, 93); by Buchanan, "I saw Sazonov this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic" (July 27, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 49); and by Paléologue, "Sazonov has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues" (July 27, *ibid.*, p. 186).

[20] Captured Russian telegram, quoted by Hoeniger, p. 81; *cf.* also pp. 11–12 and 17–20. That the order was speedily obeyed is indicated by General Rennenkampf's order no. 13,482 of July 26: "In accordance with an order from the Tsar, Kovno is on this day placed upon a war footing", quoted from the White Russian newspaper, *Homan*, for May, 1916, by Mueller-Meiningen, p. 348, note 1; and Bülow, who was consul at Kovno, was able to telegraph from Eydtkuhnen in East Prussia on July 27, at 5:35 P.M., presumably having learned the news many hours earlier: "Kovno has been placed in a state of war." *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 264.

[21] Hoeniger, p. 80.

According to this Instruction of 1913, which was one of Sukhomlinov's reform measures to improve mobilization, "'Period Preparatory to War' means the period of diplomatic complications preceding the opening of hostilities, in the course of which all boards must take the necessary measures of preparation for security and success at the mobilization of the army, the fleet, and the fortresses as well as for the march of the army to the threatened frontier."[22] According to "survey 1", in the districts on Russia's western frontier,

> it is decreed that upon the order of the Minister of War [not upon that of the Tsar] the reservists and the militia of the corps on the frontier are to be called up for military training. Out of the militia will be formed in accordance with the mobilization plan troops for securing the frontiers, the lines of communication, the telegraphs, and the other objects of military importance. The cost of this calling up of men for training is to be labelled in the accounts under the head of funds granted for military training and for practice mobilization.

This is supplemented by "survey 2", by which, upon the order of the Minister of War, the "calling up of the reservists and militia for training takes place to an extent which exceeds the funds of the current year fixed for such training and practice mobilization".[23] Thus, under cover of "preparatory measures" and "practice mobilization", military measures could be taken upon the order of the Minister of War which did not require the approval of the Tsar nor a public announcement of mobilization, but which nevertheless were almost equivalent to mobilization in those frontier districts. Such a "practice mobilization" had been undertaken in the fall of 1912 and had called forth a strong protest from the German chief of staff, Moltke—a protest which Sazonov, at that time, appeared to admit was well founded.[24] It was by these measures that Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich really began secret mobilization measures against Germany on July 26 and when war actually came surprised Germany and the world by the rapidity with which the Russian troops poured into East Prussia.

On Sunday morning, July 26, after the break-up of the manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo, Sazonov and Pourtalès met on the platform of the station and travelled up to Petrograd together. Pourtalès, finding Sazonov much calmer and more conciliatory than the day before, took advantage of this informal opportunity to point out to

[22] Quoted by Hoeniger, p. 17.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[24] *Deutschland Schuldig*, pp. 141–142; Bogitshevich, p. 39, note; Hoeniger, p. 35.

him that Austria had no hostile intentions toward Russia. He urgently advised him to have a frank and friendly talk with the Austrian ambassador, with whom he had had no words since the excited interview two days before, when he had first been confronted with the Austrian ultimatum.[25] On arriving at Petrograd, Pourtalès saw Szápáry, told him of Sazonov's calm and conciliatory state of mind, and gave him the same good advice, to seek a good long talk with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, Szápáry went to see Sazonov:

Sazonov received me very amiably in contrast to his decidedly piqued attitude on Friday. . . . Friday he had been taken somewhat by surprise, he said, and had not controlled himself so much as he had wished; and at that time, too, our interview was a wholly official one. . . . He could not deny, he said, that people in Russia had old grievances against Austria. He admitted that he had had them, too, but these belonged to the past and ought not to play any rôle in the policies of the present; and as far as the Slavs were concerned, though indeed he ought not to say this to an Austro-Hungarian ambassador, he had, he said, no sympathy at all for the Balkan Slavs. In fact, these were, he said, a heavy burden for Russia, and we could hardly imagine what one had had to suffer from them already. Our goal, he said, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered the path which we were pursuing to attain it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and, if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. [They then went over in detail the whole Austrian ultimatum, point by point.] By way of summary the Minister declared that he found that in the matter of the note it was really merely a question of phraseology and that perhaps a more acceptable way for us could be found by which these difficulties could be gotten over. . . .

At the close of the conversation, Sazonov again expressed, in the warmest words, his pleasure at the explanations which I had given and which had materially calmed him. . . .

Long is the path which has been traversed by Russian Policy in the two days from the first harsh refusal to accept our procedure . . . to a recognition of the legitimacy of our claims and to a request for mediators. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that along with this backing-water policy of the diplomatists, there is setting in a lively activity on the part of the militarists as a result of which Russia's military, and therefore also her diplomatic, situation threatens daily to become less favorable to us.

Incidentally, in our conversation, Sazonov asked whether I could give him a look into our Dossier. Upon my replying that I was not yet in possession of it, he asked whether it could not be made accessible to Shebeko [Russian ambassador] in Vienna.[26]

[25] Pourtalès's diary, *Kautsky Docs.*, vol. IV., p. 161. Szápáry to Berchtold, July 26, 2: 15 P.M., *Red Book*, II., no. 73; this despatch is incorrectly dated July 27 instead of July 26.

[26] *Red Book*, II., no 73; *cf.* also *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 217, 238; and *Dipl. Corresp.* for reports of this same interview, by Buchanan (p. 39), by Paléologue (p. 177), and by Sazonov (p. 275); also, p. 427, exhibit 5, and p. 505.

Pourtalès's advice to the two principals thus bore good results. He was warmly thanked by both. It led to the opening of "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna. It seemed to pave the way for finding some compromise, which would both satisfy Austria's demands and also make their acceptance by Serbia possible.

On Sunday afternoon or evening, after this friendly talk with Szápáry, Sazonov had another interview with Pourtalès. Sazonov, again, expressed the hope that an agreement might be reached through a change in the form of Austria's note, as it was merely a question of phraseology. In the course of the conversation Pourtalès expressed his personal suggestion, not in any way binding his government, that the following way might be found practicable:

> In case the Vienna Cabinet should consent to modify somewhat the form of its demands, as the statements of Szápáry seem to indicate is not wholly out of the question, perhaps an attempt should be made with this in view to come into direct touch with Austria-Hungary. Should an agreement result from this then Serbia could be advised by Russia to accept the demands of Austria on the basis agreed upon by Russia and Austria; and Austria could be notified of this through the mediation of a third Power. Sazonov, upon whom I again strongly impressed the fact that I did not speak in the name of my government, declared that he would at once telegraph to the Russian ambassador in Vienna along the lines of my proposal.[27]

The suggestion of "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna, as the most hopeful way out of the crisis, was a sincere and well-meant effort of the German ambassador. But, as we now know from Berchtold's intentions, there was not the slightest possibility of Austria's being willing to modify even the phraseology of her demands. As it turned out, his refusal of the "direct conversations" tended to the embitterment, rather than to the amelioration, of the relations between Russia and Austria.

While thus attempting to secure a basis for a compromise between Austria and Russia, however, Pourtalès had not failed to warn Sazonov that mobilization measures by Russia would be an exceedingly dangerous means of exerting diplomatic pressure. If Russia should attempt a bluff of this kind, the militarists everywhere would gain an increased influence and soon take the question beyond the control of the diplomatists by the purely military arguments which they knew so well how to urge. He informed Sazonov of the following statement of Germany's position, which he had received

[27] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 26, 10:10 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 238.

from Bethmann:

> After Count Berchtold's declaration to Russia that Austria does not intend any territorial gains at Serbia's expense, but only wishes to secure repose, the maintenance of the peace of Europe depends on Russia alone. We trust in Russia's love of peace and in our traditional friendly relations with her that she will take no step which will seriously endanger the peace of Europe.[28]

He also called attention to the news current among the foreign military attachés, according to which it was supposed that mobilization orders had been issued to several Russian army corps, on the western frontier. In reply Sazonov guaranteed to him that

> no mobilization orders of the sort have been issued; on the contrary, in the Ministerial Council it has been decided to delay with any such order until Austria-Hungary should take up a hostile attitude toward Russia. Sazonov admitted, however, that there had already been taken certain military preparations in order that Russia might not be caught by surprise.[29]

Sazonov does not appear to have regarded this communication as a threat on the part of Germany, for his optimism continued during the following day and with the approval of Buchanan and Paléologue he telegraphed to Vienna, proposing the "direct negotiations" He realized that they could be successful only in case Austria and Germany were convinced that Russia was not taking steps toward mobilization. He therefore telephoned to Sukhomlinov, asking him to make it plain to the German military attaché, as one military man speaking to another, that nothing but measures preparatory to a possible mobilization in certain districts against Austria was contemplated. Accordingly very late on Sunday evening, Eggeling was invited to an interview with Sukhomlinov, which Eggeling thus reports:

> Sazonov requested him [Sukhomlinov] to enlighten me on the military situation. The Minister of War gave me his word of honor that no sort of mobilization order had as yet been issued. For the present merely "preparatory measures" were being taken. Not a horse had been recruited, not a reservist called in. If Austria crosses the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed against Austria, *viz.* Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, will be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, Petrograd. Peace with Germany, he said, was urgently desired. Upon my inquiry as to the object of the mobilization against Austria, he shrugged his shoulders and indicated the diplomats. . . . I got the impression of great nervousness and anxiety. I consider the wish for peace genuine; military statements in so far correct that complete mobilization has probably not been

[28] Bethmann to Pourtalès, July 26, 1:35 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 198; vol. IV., p. 161; *cf. Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 428, exhibit 10b.

[29] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 26, 9:30 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 230; *cf.* also *Red Book*, II., no. 61.

ordered, but preparatory measures are very far-reaching. They are evidently striving to gain time for new negotiations and for a continuance of their armaments. Also the internal situation is unmistakably causing serious anxiety. The general feeling is: hope from Germany and from the mediation of His Majesty [the Kaiser].[30]

During Monday, July 27, the diplomatic situation at Petrograd remained without substantial change. Sazonov was even more conciliatory and optimistic than the day before. He still hoped that Austria's bark was worse than her bite, for he still had no news that Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia, as he had feared would be the case. He was waiting hopefully for a reply to his proposal for "direct conversations".

On Tuesday, July 28, Sazonov's optimism received several rude shocks. He was disappointed and indignant that his proposal made two days previously for "direct conversations" had met with no response from Berchtold. He was also unfavorably impressed by the fact that Szápáry could not give him the *dossier* which Austria had promised.[31] Therefore, he turned to Pourtalès and urged that Grey's plan for a conference of the Four Powers be taken up again; but he met with no encouragement from the German ambassador. On the contrary, Pourtalès complained of the hostile tone of the Russian press and of the fact that reliable reports made it clear to Germany that Russia's military preparations exceeded what Sukhomlinov had stated to Eggeling on the night of July 26. Pourtalès diplomatically expressed the suspicion that the Russian militarists were acting behind Sazonov's back and going further than the Minister of Foreign Affairs intended. He warned Sazonov again of the very serious danger which would arise from wide-reaching Russian military preparations.[32] When Sazonov went out to Peterhof for his usual Tuesday audience with the Tsar, he found in fact that the militarists had been seeing the Tsar and had been exerting great pressure upon him.[33] Later in the day, when the news arrived that Austria had declared war on Serbia at midday, Sazonov's optimism evaporated completely. He agreed that the time had come to ap-

[30] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 27, 1 A.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 242; *cf.* no. 216, and *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 427–429, exhibits 7, 11.

[31] Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 10 A.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 16; though dated July 29, the first part of this telegram refers to his conversation with Sazonov on July 28.

[32] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 28, 8:12 P.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 338; Szápáry to Berchtold, July 28 (despatched July 29, 1:15 A.M.), *Red Book*, II., no. 94.

[33] *Cf.* Tsar to King George, Aug 1, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 537; Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, *ibid.*, p. 431; Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 11 P.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 19.

prove Russia's "partial mobilization" against Austria, as had been agreed upon at the Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo on July 25. He must have come to this decision on the afternoon or evening of July 28, for on that same evening he telegraphed to the Russian ambassador in Berlin:

> In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military conscriptions of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.[34]

As Austria's declaration of war put an end to the possible success of any "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna, Sazonov now urgently appealed to Grey again to set on foot mediation with a view to the suspension of military operations against Serbia[34a]—an appeal which Grey at once adopted by strongly supporting the plan that Austria cease her military advance after occupying Belgrade, and accept mediation.

Meanwhile what did the Tsar and the chief of the General Staff do after this decision in favor of partial mobilization? The Tsar, characteristically, made a personal appeal to the Kaiser, practically admitting his own helplessness before the pressure of the Russian militarists.[35] At almost the same moment, curiously enough, the Kaiser was sending a telegram to the Tsar. Pourtalès had hinted more than once that it would be a good thing for him to send such a personal telegram, emphasizing the identity of their monarchical interests, and offering mediation between Austria and Russia.[36]

These two imperial telegrams, which reopened the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence, crossed each other on the wires. They were both, on the whole, of a conciliatory character and expressed a genuine desire to avert war. The Kaiser's telegram was in accordance with the "pledge plan" which Bethmann was already urging at Vienna as the basis for the Kaiser's mediation and a satisfactory compromise. Perhaps the two monarchs might have suc-

[34] Sazonov to Sverbeiev, July 28. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 55. Sverbeiev did not inform Bethmann, nor did Sazonov inform Pourtalès of this decision until the next morning, July 29. *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 342, 343, 359, 365, 370.

[34a] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[35] Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, 1 A.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 332; in *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431, this telegram is incorrectly worded owing to double translation, and incorrectly dated 1 P.M. instead of 1 A.M.

[36] Kaiser to Tsar, written July 28, 10:45 P.M., despatched July 29, 1:45 A.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 335; *cf. Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431. For Pourtalès's hints, advising a telegram from the Kaiser, see nos. 229, 308, 337.

ceeded in their friendly intentions had not the militarists in both countries, and particularly in Russia, precipitated matters.

The chief of the Russian General Staff, Ianushkevich, was not content with "partial mobilization". Acting with the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, he assumed the responsibility of taking steps toward a "general mobilization". In addition to notifying the commanders of the four southern districts that "partial mobilization' was about to be proclaimed, as he was authorized to do, he also, on his own responsibility, sent secret orders to Zhilinski, the commander of the Warsaw military district, and presumably to all the military districts, stating that "general mobilization" was imminent:

> July 17 [30] will be announced as the first day of our general mobilization. The announcement will follow upon the agreed telegram. 1785. [*Signed*] Lieutenant-General IANUSHKEVICH.[37]

One can imagine how the receipt of this telegram would lead the Russian commanders at Warsaw and at other posts along the German frontier to strain every nerve to take all possible secret steps toward preparing for war, short of a public announcement of mobilization.[38] Thus, on the early morning of July 29, under pretense of merely mobilizing in four districts to bluff Austria, Ianushkevich was really preparing a general mobilization of all European Russia, thus threatening Germany, in addition to the "measures preparatory to war" which had already been going on in the frontier districts since July 26. There was therefore a genuine ground for the fears which Pourtalès and Szápáry expressed that the militarists were acting behind the back of the Tsar, who ought to be clearly informed

[37] Telegram no. 1785, Ianushkevich to Zhilinski, July 29, *ca.* 7:20 A.M.; quoted by Hoeniger, pp. 100–101. Some hours earlier he had also asked the Warsaw commander about arrangements for disembarking troops which were being pushed forward toward the German frontier (telegram no. 1746, July 28, 11:58 P.M.; *ibid.*, p. 105). Aware that Russian troops, expecting at any moment the publication of "general mobilization", might commit some act of hostility against Germany on the frontier which would compromise his own illegal action, and also compromise Russia with her allies, by making Russia seem to be the aggressor, he was careful to order explicitly that the opening of hostilities was not to take place except upon a special telegram, and that the frontier troops were to be warned, "in order that no irremediable mistakes occur" (telegram no. 1754, July 29, 1:10 A.M.; *ibid.*, p. 105).

[38] That Ianushkevich on the early morning of July 29 was telegraphing that "general mobilization" was about to be announced is further indicated by Zhilinski's telegram of the following day: "The Chief of the General Staff telegraphed yesterday that July 30 would be announced as the first day of mobilization, but since this has not taken place I conclude that changes have taken place in the political situation. Would it not be possible to inform me of the changes which have occurred in this matter? 1954." (Zhilinski to Sukhomlinov, July 30, 2:25 P.M., quoted in Hoeniger, p. 110).

of the true situation and its dangers. Though the order for "partial mobilization" had been decided upon on July 28, it could not be legally proclaimed until the Tsar's signature had been signed to a formal ukaz. Accordingly, before noon on July 29, Ianushkevich went out to Peterhof to secure the Tsar's signature. He probably argued there strongly in favor of the "general mobilization" which he had already secretly notified the commanders was imminent, but without telling the Tsar what he had been doing secretly. But peace-loving Nicholas, counting on his own appeal to the Kaiser, and on the Kaiser's telegram which he had by that time received, was only willing to sign the ukaz for "partial mobilization". With this in his pocket Ianushkevich hurried back to Petrograd and after trying to mislead the German military attaché as to Russia's military measures and plans,[39] began to send out the telegrams as the Tsar's ukaz authorized him to do, ordering "partial mobilization" in the four districts "against Austria" and proclaiming that mobilization was to be considered as beginning at midnight between July 29 and 30.[40]

Meanwhile on this fatal afternoon and evening of July 29 the Tsar and Sazonov were becoming more and more perturbed. About 1 P.M., Sazonov had complained to Pourtalès that he still had no answer from Vienna to his proposal of three days before for "direct conversations". "Shebeko, who received instructions in regard to this, still reports nothing from authoritative persons [in Vienna], and similarly Szápáry declares he has received no instructions and he must doubt therefore Austria's good will." He therefore notified

[39] Eggeling's report in *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 370; about half this report is omitted in the report as given in the German *White Book* (*Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 410). Eggeling's pamphlet, pp. *25–42*; Russian newspapers reporting the third day of the Sukhomlinov trial.

[40] None of these original telegrams were captured by the Germans, but a copy of an order based on them was found: "Order for the troops of the Smolensk Garrison. On 16 [29] of this July His Majesty commands the troops of the Moscow military district to mobilize. The first mobilization day is to count from midnight between July 29 and 30. [*Signed*] Lieut.-Gen. ALEXEIEV." (Quoted by Hoeniger, pp. 108–109.) As this bears a mark indicating that it was "received on July 30 at 4: 50 A.M.", the General Staff telegram on which it was based must have been despatched from Petrograd several hours earlier. *Cf.* the similar secondary telegrams sent by Gen. Sievers to the 10th Army Corps at Kharkov in the Kiev military district (July 30, 10: 30 A.M.) and by Gen. Nikitin to the 7th Army in the Odessa military district (July 30, exact hour not indicated). *Ibid.* At the Sukhomlinov trial, as will be indicated below, both Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich testified that at the time of their three-cornered telephone conversation with the Tsar, *i.e.*, late in the evening of July 29, "mobilization was already in full swing"; "it was technically impossible to stop it"; Ianushkevich said he knew that "already 400,000 reservists has been called up".

Pourtalès, as Sverbeiev had already notified Bethmann in Berlin, that

as Austria has mobilized eight corps which in part must be regarded as directed against Russia, Russia sees herself compelled likewise to mobilize the military districts on the Austrian frontier. The order will be given today . . . But in Russia mobilization is far from meaning the same thing as in the West European countries; the Russian army could, according to circumstances, stand for weeks with arms grounded without crossing the frontier.

Pourtalès, knowing well the power of the militarists at Berlin, warned Sazonov of his fear that the General Staffs of the Central Powers would not surrender their advantage over Russia in the matter of rapidity of mobilization and would press for countermeasures.[41] Later in the afternoon, Sazonov's indignation was greatly stirred by receiving at last Berchtold's "categorical refusal" to enter into the "direct conversations" he had suggested. He therefore pressed the English and German ambassadors for a return to Grey's proposal for mediation.[42] Sazonov's indignation was further increased by the news that the Austrians had bombarded Belgrade. As Szápáry reported to Berchtold:

Since the German ambassador told me that Sazonov showed himself very much excited over Your Excellency's refusal to continue an exchange of views with Russia and over Austria's mobilization . . . I sought the Minister out to clear up some misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist and incidentally to get a closer look into Russia's plans. . . . He further informed me that a ukaz would be signed today which ordered a mobilization of a somewhat wide extent. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official manner that their troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand ready with grounded arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for it was a question only of a precautionary measure that Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also so great a start. . . . While we were thus engaged in a confidential exchange of views, the Minister heard through the telephone that we had bombarded Belgrade. He was like a changed man [war wie ausgewechselt]. . . . "You only wish to gain time by negotiation but you go ahead and bombard an unprotected city!" "What precisely will you further conquer, when you have taken possession of the capital," and more such childish remarks. . . . I left him in a most extremely excited state. . . .[43]

41 Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 1:58 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 343. Chelius to Kaiser, an hour later, reported that the circle around the Tsar, after the Austrian declaration of war and refusal to accept Serbia's conciliatory answer, "now regards general war as almost inevitable". *Ibid.*, no. 344.

42 Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 6:10 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 365. Buchanan to Grey, July 29, *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 60–61.

43 Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 11 P.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 19; *cf. Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 522–524.

About 7 P.M. Pourtalès had still another interview with Sazonov. This was the reflex of Russia's expressed intention of declaring partial mobilization. Bethmann, on being informed by Sverbeiev about noon of Russia's intention, had at once telegraphed to Pourtalès "to explain very earnestly to Sazonov that a further advance of Russia's mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize, and that then a European war could hardly be averted".[44] In informing Sazonov of this instruction, Pourtalès says he emphasized that this was not a threat, but only a friendly expression of opinion. But Sazonov, who by now was "very excited", regarded it as an unfriendly threat; nevertheless he said he would report it to the Tsar.[45]

In informing France of this interview Sazonov justified Russia's partial mobilization on the ground of Austria's actions, and represented Pourtalès's communication as a threat which made war probably inevitable:

> As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration, which the French ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable for us.[46]

To both Buchanan and Paléologue Sazonov was still careful to emphasize that Russia was only proceeding with partial mobilization. To neither did he indicate that he intended to extend "partial" into "general" mobilization. For he knew that to do so would be against the wishes of France[47] and would make it far less likely that Russia could secure the support of England. When he informed the Tsar of his interview with Pourtalès the Tsar also appears to have thought that Russia had gone far enough. Clinging to the hope that he and the Kaiser might avert the war which Bethmann's threat made the excited Sazonov regard as "probably

[44] *Kautsky Docs.* no. 342.

[45] Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 8 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 378.

[46] Sazonov to Russian ambassador in Paris, July 29. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 287. *Cf.* also Sazonov's reports of the interview to Buchanan and Paléologue, *ibid.*, pp. 60–61, 210.

[47] Viviani to Paléologue: "I think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces" (evidently written on the evening of July 29 though dated July 30, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 210).

inevitable", the Tsar sent a second telegram to the Kaiser:

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented today by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendshp. Your loving NICKY.[48]

This telegram does not intimate that the Tsar had changed his mind in adhering to partial mobilization as a sufficient measure, even after Sazonov had informed him of Pourtalès's "threat" at 7 P.M.

A little later in the evening the Tsar in turn received a second telegram from the Kaiser. William II. insisted that "Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable", and, in the dominating tone which he had so often found successful in the past with the Tsar, told him warningly:

It would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed you, my government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course, military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help. WILLY.[49]

The Kaiser apparently judged correctly the effect of this tone on the weak and changeable "Nicky", for the Tsar, ruminating on the situation, began to think he had made a mistake in signing the ukaz for mobilization. He thought he had better countermand it and therefore called up Sukhomlinov on the telephone. The three-cornered telephone conversation which followed—one of the most curious, sinister, and obscure of the militarist doings of those dark days—was discussed at length on the third day of the Sukhomlinov trial. Ianushkevich was the first witness. He had evidently come into court with a carefully concocted story and impressed all the newspaper reporters by his glibness. "He speaks smoothly and very calmly and is not at all agitated. He appears in every respect the former professor of the War Academy."[50] "His testimony is distinguished for its great fluency. He is evidently a practised orator who knows how to talk on every occasion."[51] In a speech

[48] Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, 8:20 P.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 366; *cf. Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 542. I assume that the Tsar here refers to the Kaiser's first telegram, which he had not yet answered, and not to a second telegram, to be mentioned in a moment, which though written at 6:30 P.M. had probably not yet reached the Tsar.

[49] Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, 6:30 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 359; *cf. Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431.

[50] *Izviestiia*, no. 145, Aug. 16 [29], 1917.

[51] *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, 13 [26] Aug., 1917.

which can be proven to be full of misstatements he testified among other things:

When Austria launched her provocation against Serbia, we naturally had to come forward in the rôle of a final protector. It was plain to everyone that Germany was standing behind the back of Austria, and that is why I insisted on a declaration of complete mobilization, although this might appear to be a direct provocation in respect to Germany. And so this was decided upon. On July 14 [27] I received the command to proclaim complete mobilization,[52] and in the evening after making all the arrangements, I set off for the Council of Ministers where I also secured the signature of three ministers, which is necessary for the proclamation of the order.[53] When I returned they rang me up on the telephone from Tsarskoe Selo[54] and informed me that Emperor William had sent a telegram to the Tsar, in which he assured him on the word of honor of a monarch that Germany would not proceed against Russia if she were not forced to this by following Russia.[55]

When I received the information about Wilhelm's telegram, I knew that Germany had already mobilized.[56] I had information that by that time 400,000 [Russian] men were already mobilized. I insisted that it was impossible to put any trust in the telegram, even though it was supported by Wilhelm's word of honor and I begged that the general mobilization should not be revoked. But the word of honor of the Kaiser triumphed and I received the order to proclaim only "partial mobilization".

Then I set off for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov; I told him everything; I explained the plan of our mobilization; and I begged him to take the measures which depended on him.

On July 17 [30] Sazonov went with a report to Tsarkoe Selo and returned from there with orders to reconsider the question of mobilization. We arranged a conference in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, and I took part. Thanks to our unan-

[52] From whom did he receive this command? The Tsar? Sukhomlinov? Sazonov? He does not say. Or did he act on his own responsibility? The date, July 27, is certainly a mistake for July 29; if he had really received orders to proclaim "general mobilization" on the 27th, he would have lost no time in sending out the telegrams. Some of the newspapers, trying to reconcile his statement with known facts, give July 29, others give July 30. His reference below to the Kaiser's telegram makes it clear that he must be talking about July 29.

[53] In another part of his evidence he declared that a ukaz signed by the Tsar was necessary for the proclamation of a mobilization order.

[54] The Tsar at this time was not at Tsarskoe Selo. He was at Peterhof, as is proven by the fact that his telegrams to the Kaiser on July 29 at 1 A.M. and at 8:20 P.M. are both dated from Peterhof. (*Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 332 and 366.) After returning from the military review at Krasnoe Selo on the 25th, the Tsar apparently remained at Peterhof during the following critical days until he came to Petrograd on July 31 (*ibid.*, no. 487).

[55] There is nothing in the Kaiser's telegram about his word of honor; see the telegram above, note 49.

[56] This was not true. Germany did not begin to mobilize under cover of the "Threatened State of War" until about 1 P.M., July 31, that is, not until two days later.

imous opinion about mobilization, our conference lasted only five minutes. We all gave our opinion in favor of complete mobilization. I called His Majesty on the telephone and informed him of our decision. His Majesty heard me and directed me to hand over the telephone receiver to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and after a conversation with him, we reached the decision to put into effect the general mobilization of all the Russian armies.[57]

These revelations produced a great sensation in the court room. Sukhomlinov asked to be heard. In contrast to Ianushkevich "he speaks very simply in language easy to understand, but is greatly agitated, gesticulating wildly with his hands and striking himself upon the chest".[58]

On the night of July 16 to 17 [29 to 30] the Tsar rang me up on the telephone and said that he had received news which gave a possibility of escaping from war. Therefore, he ordered that the partial mobilization in the four districts should be suspended.[59] The question of mobilization was very acute at this time and I therefore reported my conviction that it was necessary that this mobilization should be completed in a shorter period of time than it had ever been completed before. On receiving the command to suspend mobilization in the four districts, I was completely dumbfounded. This was the limit. [I received a direct command, a precise command, which allowed of no kind of objections. . . . Mobilization had already been ordered, and if it were revoked a catastrophe threatened. What was I to do? I knew that it was impossible to revoke the mobilization; that technically it could not be carried through; what would then happen in Russia? God knows what a mess we should have been in. I felt I was being done for.] When the Tsar informed me that a telegram had been received from Wilhelm to the effect that Germany had no intention of making an attack, I, knowing Wilhelm, made up my mind that he was simply playing a trick and that he simply wished to delay our preparations so that he could demolish us after having overpowered France. Therefore, when the Tsar told me about this telegram and said that mobilization must be suspended, I said to him, "But Wilhelm does not guarantee us anything at all." To this the Tsar replied, "He is exerting himself to bring pressure to bear upon Austria."[60] And upon that he added, "Why do you not wish to cancel mobilization?" I replied categorically that if mobilization should be cancelled, it would be absurd, for it would not be possible to recommence it on account of technical difficulties. "If you do not be-

[57] *Izviestiia*, no. 145, Aug. 16 [29], 1917.

[58] *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, Aug. 13 [26], 1919. The report which follows is from the *Russkiia Viedomosti*, no. 185, Aug. 13 [26], 1917, except the parts in brackets, which are from the *Novoe Vremia*.

[59] Oman (p. 70), quoting from some newspaper which he does not name and which I have not been able to find, gives this statement: "The Tsar told me it was necessary to break off the mobilization in the *three* military districts," and explains in a note, "This undoubtedly means the Wilna, Warsaw, Petrograd districts on the front opposite Germany."

[60] That the Kaiser was really exerting this pressure is now clear from what has been said above, vol. XXVI., pp. 41–53.

lieve me," I added to the Tsar, "ask the chief of the General Staff." The Tsar replied, "Very well," and he called General Ianushkevich to the telephone. . . .

Half an hour later, Ianushkevich rang me up, and said that His Majesty had commanded him by telephone to suspend mobilization, but that General Ianushkevich replied that it was technically impossible to do this. His Majesty replied to him, "Nevertheless, suspend it!" General Ianushkevich asked what he was to do then. [I replied to him, "Do nothing at all."] "I knew," adds Sukhomlinov, "that the responsibility rested on me and I gave orders that mobilization should not be suspended, for which General Ianushkevich thanked me." . . . ["On the next morning, I lied to His Majesty, explaining that mobilization was proceeding only in the districts of the Southwest. On this day I nearly lost my reason. I knew that mobilization was in full swing, and that it was impossible to stop it. Fortunately, on the same day the Tsar was convinced afresh, and I was thanked for the good execution of mobilization; otherwise I should have been in jail long ago," said Sukhomlinov fervently].

About one P.M. of the next day, our ambassador in Germany, Sverbeiev, sent a telegram that general mobilization had been proclaimed there. Instantly a great stone rolled away from my heart. Everything was ending happily and I was thanked.

Though the testimony of the two generals agreed on many points, it differed absolutely on one important matter. Sukhomlinov said that the Tsar ordered the "partial mobilization" of the four districts to be suspended, that is, all mobilization. Ianushkevich said the Tsar spoke of substituting "partial" for "general" mobilization, implying that the Tsar already knew that "general mobilization" had already been ordered and was going on. To clear up this contradiction Ianushkevich was recalled to the witness stand. Under cross-examination, and when faced with extracts from Sukhomlinov's diary, he hesitated, became confused, and on several points admitted he could not remember or was mistaken. His carefully prepared story broke down, although he still insisted that the Tsar had spoken of substituting "partial" for "general" mobilization. Sukhomlinov's lawyers wished to call as witnesses two of the Tsar's servants, who were supposed to have heard the telephone conversations, but the court, unfortunately, for some reason which is not given, refused the request.

From these two narratives, the following points are tolerably clear: (1) About 11 P.M. on July 29, Russian "partial mobilization" was in full swing. This is confirmed by the captured telegrams quoted above. (2) This "partial mobilization" had been caused directly by Austria's refusal of "direct conversations" and by her declaration of war on Serbia. (3) The Tsar, influenced by the Kaiser's telegram, made a serious effort, though perhaps one

impracticable on technical considerations, to stop mobilization of some kind.[61] (4) But the Tsar was flatly disobeyed and deceived by the Russian militarists, who thereby rendered futile the Kaiser's efforts to check Russian military measures until he could effect a settlement by his mediation at Vienna. (5) On July 30 the Tsar was persuaded to approve "general mobilization", thereby at last making legal and regular the secret military measures which his militarists had disobediently been carrying on behind his back. Naturally their minds were thereby greatly relieved, and in 1917 they could boast of their patriotic action. (6) An element in this final persuasion of the Tsar was quite probably the arrival of Sverbeiev's telegram from Berlin: "I learn that the order for the mobilization of the German army and navy has just been issued."[62] (7) Shortly after five o'clock, secret telegrams began to be despatched to the frontier districts against Germany, ordering, at last, the long-awaited announcement of "general mobilization".[63] A little later telegrams were despatched to the regions where "partial mobilization" had already been in full regular progress for twenty-four hours, announcing "general mobilization" and ordering that mobilization was to be reckoned as beginning at midnight between July 30–31, instead of at midnight of July 29–30.[64] It was almost at the same time that Austria had decided to announce "general mobilization". Thus the announcement of "general mobilization" in both Austria and Russia took place practically simultaneously before the news could go from one country to the other. Neither was the cause of the other, though the contrary has been often asserted by both parties.

Germany's mobilization, on the other hand, was directly caused

[61] Professor Oman (pp. 63 ff.) thinks that it was "general" mobilization which the Tsar had sanctioned a few hours earlier as a result of the "formal threat" which Pourtalès made to Sazonov about 7 P.M. This would be in accordance with Ianushkevich's testimony, but there are many objections to this view. It is more probable that the statement of Sukhomlinov is correct that the Tsar spoke and knew only of "partial mobilization"; and that no authorized order for "general mobilization" was despatched on the night of July 29. What Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich were boasting of in 1917 were the secret "measures preparatory to war" which had been ordered before dawn on July 26, and which were stimulated by their secret telegram of the morning of July 29 to the effect that "general mobilization" was imminent.

[62] Russian *Orange Book,* no. 61. This was due to the well-known *Lokal-anzeiger* episode.

[63] Telegrams nos. 1945 (received at Warsaw, July 30, 8: 15 P.M.) and 1946 (despatched to Kovno Fortress at 7: 15 P.M.). Hoeniger, pp. 114–118.

[64] Telegram no. 1965, General Staff to the Moscow military district, July 30, *ca.* 11: 20 P.M. Hoeniger, pp. 117–118.

by that of Russia. In fact it came rather surprisingly late. Neither Pourtalès nor Eggeling had been told anything of the decision which Russia had made for "general mobilization" on July 30. They knew nothing of it until the next morning after the news had already been printed in the Russian newspapers and been posted up in the streets. As soon as Eggeling learned of it, he hastened to Pourtalès, who sent off a despatch at 10:20 A.M.: "General mobilization of the army and navy ordered. First mobilization day, July 31."[65] This reached Berlin at 11:40 A.M. Bethmann telephoned it to the Kaiser at Potsdam. The Kaiser motored at once to Berlin and in a meeting with Bethmann and the militarists decided about 1:00 P.M. to order the "Threatened State of War". Until the arrival of this official despatch from Pourtalès, confirming the German suspicions that Russia had been secretly mobilizing, Bethmann had been able to restrain the Kaiser and the militarists from taking any irremediable military steps; but with "Threatened State of War", the whole German military machine was set in swiftest possible motion, though formal mobilization was not declared until the following day. The militarists were now in complete control. In Berlin, as well as in Petrograd, war was now inevitable.[66] Neither the "Russian formula" which Sazonov had proposed to Pourtalès, nor the personal appeal which Pourtalès made on his own initiative to the Tsar at Peterhof, nor the Kaiser's efforts at Vienna, nor Sir Edward Grey's efforts, could have any possible chance of success. If the German government, on July 31, had really desired peace, it would have been possible for it simply to answer Russian mobilization by German mobilization, and stand on the defensive. But the German militarists insisted that mobilization meant war and therefore Bethmann despatched the ultimata to Russia and to France, to which but one answer was possible on their part.

In conclusion one may say that Bethmann, by his *carte blanche* to Austria and by his apparent endorsement at first of her policy toward Serbia, gave Russia reasonable grounds for thinking that Serbia was about to be treated intolerably. Russia, on account of her role as protector of Serbia, and because of her political interests in the Balkans, could not permit Serbia to be crushed or become a vassal of Austria. Bethmann was thus responsible for Russia's provisional decision of July 25 for "partial mobilization", which was justifiable; but Bethmann played directly into the hands of the Russian militarists. Sazonov's optimism about "direct conversa-

[65] *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 473.

[66] *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 456, 473, 477, 479, 480, 488, 490.

tions", like Bethmann's optimism about "localization", was rendered futile by the uncompromising and reckless procedure of Berchtold at Vienna, and by the pressure of their own militarists in Petrograd and Berlin. Bethmann's belated efforts to restrain Austria and impose the "pledge plan" came so late that the Russian militarists, in spite of, rather than because of, German threats, were able to proceed to "complete mobilization". This action in turn played directly into the hands of the German militarists and made the war inevitable.

Relatively little material has appeared since the war which throws new light on the part played by France and England in the crisis which followed the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Neither government unfortunately has seen fit to make that fuller publication of documents which would clear up many obscure points, particularly as to their relations with one another in view of their common danger from Germany. Such a publication would increase that feeling of mutual frankness among nations upon which the peace of the world in the future might rest more securely. In view of this lack of new material, only a word, therefore, will be said as to these two countries and in regard to Belgium.

Belgium had done nothing in any way to justify the demand which Germany made upon her. With commendable prudence, at the very first news of the ominous Austrian ultimatum, she had foreseen the danger to which she might be exposed. She had accordingly instructed her representatives abroad as to the statements which they were to make in case Belgium should decide very suddenly to mobilize to protect her neutrality.[67] On July 29, she placed her army upon "a strengthened war footing", but did not order complete mobilization until two days later, when Austria, Russia, and Germany had already done so, and war appeared inevitable. Even after being confronted with the terrible German ultimatum, at 7 P.M. on August 2, she did not at once invite the assistance of English and French troops to aid her in the defense of her soil and her neutrality against a certain German assault; it was not until German troops had actually violated her territory, on August 4, that she appealed for the assistance of the Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality.[68] Belgium was the innocent victim of the German militarists.

As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption

[67] Davignon's circular, July 24, Belgian *Gray Book*, no 2.

[68] *Ibid.*, nos. 8, 10, 15, 20, 23, 24, 30, 38, 40.

of the three-year term of military service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits (Joffre, Grand Duke Nicholas, Poincaré), by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close relations with England, and however much by these same measures she may have aroused the suspicions of Germany,[69] there can be no doubt that when the crisis came, she sincerely did her best to avert it. While Poincaré was out of touch on the high seas, returning from Russia, the French acting minister of foreign affairs, Bienvenu-Martin, was too distraught to exercise much influence anywhere, though he did endeavor to persuade Grey to adopt the French solution of a strong English warning to Germany. When Poincaré and Viviani returned to Paris, they were careful to take particular pains, such as withdrawing the French troops ten kilometres from the frontiers, to avoid the slightest possibility of any frontier friction, which Germany might regard as a grievance. It is not clear how far these genuinely pacific measures toward the end of the diplomatic crisis mark a change from a previous more vigorous and aggressive policy. Nor is it clear whether this change, if change there was, was due to the bad impression made on Poincaré by the strikes in Russia, or to the French Socialists and French domestic political troubles, or to the fact that England seemed to be on the threshold of a civil war in Ireland, or simply to the terribleness of a European war, the main blow of which was certain to fall upon France.

In regard to England's responsibility, the most important recent book is that of Lord Loreburn, *How the War Came* (London, 1919). One may certainly agree with him in censuring Grey for involving England in secret understandings with France into which other members of the Cabinet, to say nothing of Parliament, were not initiated. This was not in accord with what was understood to be the constitutional practice in England, and it resulted, in 1914, in England's being unable either to find a successful means of averting war, or to wage war immediately with adequate means. One may even agree with Lord Loreburn that Grey's hands were not so free in July, 1914, as he sought to make it appear. But on the other hand, they were not so completely tied as Lord Loreburn represents. One may say that Grey was under a moral obligation to use the British navy to protect the north coast of France, and he fulfilled this obligation by his declaration on August 2 that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel, or through the North Sea, to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power". But this is not the

[69] *Cf.* Kuhl, pp. 81–83.

same thing as saying, as Lord Loreburn does, that England was bound to support France in war on land. The distinction, perhaps, is an impracticable one, but it is sufficient, essentially to justify Grey's attitude that England's hands were free and that it was still for Parliament and public opinion to dictate whether England should stand aside or not. England went into the war from three mixed motives: to fulfill her obligations to France, to preserve her honor in upholding her guarantee of Belgian neutrality, and to protect her own safety and material interests against German aggression. That Grey, in his speech in Parliament, very skillfully put forward very prominently the second of these motives, there is no doubt; and if he believed, as of course he did, that England ought under the circumstances to fight, he did so wisely; for this was the motive which would most clearly and powerfully appeal to Parliament and the British public. On the other hand, it is doubtful if one can agree with Lord Loreburn's further criticism of Grey for not making a plain, timely statement to Germany that, if she attacked France, England would be on the side of France and Russia. It is very doubtful, in view of the strong anti-British feeling in Germany, the blind Pan-Germanism, the power of the militarists, and the Kaiser's sensitiveness to a second rebuff after Agadir, whether such a threat would not have had exactly the opposite effect in Germany. It would have been regarded as the proof and culmination of British "encirclement". Even granting that it might have postponed the war over the Austro-Serbian crisis for some months, it would have so increased the Anglo-German embitterment that some other occasion would probably have soon set Europe on fire after Germany had made further frantic naval and military preparations. As Buchanan wisely told Sazonov, on July 27,[70] "Germany's attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace. England could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend, who was anxious to preserve peace." Moreover, such a threat by England might have served as a dangerous encouragement to the Russian militarists in their aggressive aspirations toward Constantinople and the Straits. Grey had to choose a policy; because he chose one which did not turn out successfully, it is not necessarily true to say that he chose the wrong one. If a criticism of Grey is to be made, it is that he, like Bethmann and Sazonov, was too optimistic—too little aware of the monstrous influence which the militarists would acquire in Vienna, Berlin, and Petrograd.

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[70] *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 39–40.